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ABSTRACT
In response to claims that the threat of environmental liability under the
Superfund law deters the acquisition of potentially contaminated sites (or
“brownfields”) for redevelopment, the federal government has adopted
programs to protect purchasers from liability.  This protection may be
unwarranted, however, if sellers can simply adjust property prices downward
to compensate buyers for this liability.  We present a model of joint and
several liability under Superfund that allows us to distinguish four different
reasons that this liability may discourage the purchase of brownfields.  The
previous literature has overlooked the effects that we identify, which all arise
because a sale may increase the number of defendants in a suit to recover
cleanup costs.  Our analysis suggests that the brownfields problem may be
more widespread than one might infer from the prior literature.  Furthermore,
the effects that we identify may distort not only the incentives to sell property
subject to Superfund liability but also any decision of any party subject to any
joint and several liability if that decision could affect the number of other
defendants liable for the same harm.
CONTENTS
I.  Previous Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II.  Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.  Other Liable Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.  Independent Outcomes at Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C.  Litigation Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
D.  Settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.  Correlated Outcomes at Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
a.  Two Defendants and Zero Litigation Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
b.  Other Defendants and Litigation Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.  Independent Outcomes at Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.  Implications for the General Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
III.  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
  * Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Associate
Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, respectively.  Copyright © 2007 by Howard F.
Chang and Hilary Sigman.  We wish to thank Lucian Bebchuk, David Gilo, Jason Johnston,
Daniel Klerman, Richard Revesz, and conference participants at the 2007 meeting of the
American Law and Economics Association and the 2006 meetings of the European
Association of Law and Economics, of the World Congress of Environmental and Resource
Economists, of the Canadian Law and Economics Association, and on Game Theory and
Practice Dedicated to Development, Natural Resources, and the Environment, and workshop
participants at Tel Aviv University, Bar-Ilan University, and Drexel University for helpful
comments.  We developed this paper under STAR Research Assistance Agreement No.
R831777, awarded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but the EPA has
not formally reviewed this paper.  The views expressed in this document are those of the
authors, and the EPA does not endorse any products or commercial services mentioned in
this paper.
  1 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000).
  2 See id. § 9607(a).
  3 See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992);
O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990);
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1312-13 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United
States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1395-96 (D.N.H. 1985); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
THE EFFECT OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
UNDER SUPERFUND ON BROWNFIELDS
HOWARD F. CHANG and HILARY SIGMAN*
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA),1 also known as the federal Superfund statute, makes
certain specified parties potentially responsible for the costs of cleaning up a
contaminated site.  These potentially responsible parties (PRPs) may include
the current owners of such a site, generators and transporters of hazardous
waste, and certain prior owners of the site.2  Courts have interpreted CERCLA
to impose joint and several liability on these PRPs for any indivisible harm
caused by hazardous substances at the site.3  Joint and several liability allows
the government to recover the full costs of cleanup at the site from any PRP,
regardless of the PRP’s equitable share of the liability.
Many commercial real estate developers and observers claim that the threat
of Superfund liability deters the acquisition of potentially contaminated sites
for redevelopment.  This claim has stirred concerns about “brownfield” sites,
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  4 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(39)(A) (West Supp. 2005).
  5 See 4 U.S. Conference of Mayors, Recycling America’s Land: A National Report on
Brownfields Redevelopment 12 (2003).
  6 See id. at 14.
  7 See Kris Wernstedt, et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon:  Much Ado about Something or
the Timing of the Shrewd? 17 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 04-46, 2004);
Kris Wernstedt, Peter B. Meyer & Anna Alberini, Attracting Private Investment to
Contaminated Properties:  The Value of Public Interventions, 25 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt.
347, 361 (2006).
  8 “Brownfields,” according to the EPA definition, “are abandoned, idled, or under-used
industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real
or perceived environmental contamination.”  Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance,
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Policy Toward Owners of Property Containing Contaminated
Aquifers 1 (1995).
which CERCLA defines as “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or
reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”4  Many communities seek to
encourage the redevelopment of these “brownfields” because these sites are
considered not only sources of urban blight but also substitutes for the
introduction of new industrial sites in suburban rural locations, sometimes
known as “greenfields.”  The use of greenfields would reduce open space,
contribute to suburban sprawl, and require construction of new infrastructure.
A U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) survey found 95,000 acres of
brownfields in 192 responding cities.5  The USCM survey respondents listed
“liability issues” as second only to “lack of clean up funds” as an obstacle to
the redevelopment of these sites.6  Similarly, a recent survey of private
developers indicated that they consider protection from liability for cleanup
costs to be a valuable incentive to buy and to develop contaminated sites.7
Responding to the problem of brownfields, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), local communities, and developers have explored
various ways to encourage the redevelopment of these sites.8  In 1995, the
EPA announced that it would issue more “comfort letters” to assure owners
engaged in cleanups that the EPA would not subject their properties to further
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  9 Robert V. Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 269 (4th ed.
2003); Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy 1018 (3d ed. 2004); Timothy
Noah, EPA Plans Rules to Limit Liability of Superfund Sites, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at A5.
  10 Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective Purchasers
of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792
(1995).
  11 Id. at 34,794.
  12 Id. at 34,792-93.
  13 Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
  14 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(r) (West Supp. 2005).
CERCLA actions.9  As part of its brownfields initiative, the EPA also sought
to expand the use of “prospective purchaser agreements,” whereby a
prospective purchaser and the EPA enter a binding contract that includes a
“covenant not to sue” the prospective purchaser under CERCLA.10  Under
such an agreement, the government agrees not to sue the purchaser for any
existing contamination in exchange for “adequate consideration,” such as
reimbursement of cleanup costs or the performance of specified cleanup work
by the prospective purchaser.11  The EPA announced that it would consider
such agreements if they would provide a “substantial” benefit, including “a
payment for cleanup or a commitment to perform a response action” or
benefits to the local community “through the creation or retention of jobs,
productive use of abandoned property, or revitalization of blighted areas.”12
In 2002, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act13 amended the Superfund law to exempt a “bona fide
prospective purchaser” from liability as an “owner” under CERCLA as long as
the purchaser “does not impede the performance of a response action or
natural resource restoration” at the site.14  Purchasers are exempt from this
liability if they meet certain specified conditions.  The definition of “bona fide
prospective purchaser,” for example, requires the purchaser to show that all
disposal of hazardous substances at the site took place before the purchaser
acquired the property, to undertake “all appropriate inquiries” to discover any
contamination, to exercise “appropriate care” with respect to hazardous
substances found at the site by taking “reasonable steps” to stop any
continuing release of those substances and to prevent any future release, and to
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  15 Id. § 9601(40).
  16 Id. § 9604(k).
  17 See Mark Reisch, Resources, Science & Indus. Div., Congressional Research Serv.,
Brownfields and Superfund Issues in the 108th Congress (2004).
  18 See Environmental Law Inst., An Analysis of State Superfund Programs:  50-State Study,
2001 Update 32-33 (2002); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Recycling Land: Encouraging the
Redevelopment of Contaminated Property, Nat. Resources & Env’t, Spring 1996, at 3, 4-5.
  19 Geltman, supra note 18, at 9; see Environmental Law Inst., supra note 18, at 41-43; Plater
et al., supra note 9, at 1019-20; Charles Bartsch & Rachel Deane, Brownfields State of the
States: An End-of-Session Review of Initiatives and Program Impacts in the 50 States (5th ed.
2002).
  20 See Chris Clarke, Update Comparative Legal Study on Environmental Liability (2001).
provide “full cooperation” with the government or other persons conducting
“response actions.”15  The legislation also creates a program of federal grants
to states and local communities for “assessment,” “remediation,” and
“revitalization” of brownfields.16  Despite all these measures, some critics
remain dissatisfied with Superfund liability.17
Moreover, each state has its own laws governing the cleanup of
contaminated sites in addition to the federal Superfund law.  Many state rules
mimic the CERCLA liability provisions, including joint and several liability
for owners and a broad set of other parties, but some states use different
rules.18  Most states also have their own brownfields programs, which offer
various incentives for prospective purchasers and developers, including
“comfort” or “no further action” letters and covenants not to sue.19
Similarly, joint and several liability is both common and controversial in
the environmental laws of other countries.  Most members of the European
Union (EU) and other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), for example, rely on joint and several
environmental liability to some extent but have increasingly limited its scope.20
Thus, an analysis of the effects of the federal Superfund regime in the United
States provides not only the basis for an evaluation that regime but also some
guidance for both states and other countries considering whether to adopt laws
and policies similar to those adopted by the U.S. government.
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Superfund liability may well inhibit the development of contaminated
property by discouraging buyers from purchasing these sites, but the reasons
for such an effect are more subtle than they might first appear.  After all, if the
liability rules merely forced the buyer to accept some share of a fixed expected
liability that they would otherwise impose on the seller, then they would not
deter a developer from buying the property as long as that transaction would
efficiently transfer the property to the party that would produce greater value
from the property.  The parties would simply adjust the price of the property
downward to reflect the transfer of liability from seller to buyer, and this
discount would ensure that economically efficient transactions go forward in
spite of this transfer of liability.
In Section I of this paper, we survey theories proposed in the previous
economic literature suggesting how environmental liability may discourage the
redevelopment of contaminated sites despite the tendency for land prices to
compensate buyers for the liabilities associated with the property.  In Section
II of this paper, we present a formal model of joint and several liability under
Superfund and advance four different reasons for this Superfund liability to
discourage the purchase of contaminated property.  The previous literature has
overlooked the four effects that we identify, which all arise because the
purchase may increase the number of defendants in a suit to recover cleanup
costs.  First, a sale may increase the share of liability that a seller and a buyer
may expect to pay as a group.  Second, a sale may increase the amount of
damages that the government can expect to recover from the PRPs at trial.
Third, a sale may increase the total litigation costs that a buyer and a seller
may face as a group.  Fourth, a sale may increase the amount that the
government can expect to extract from PRPs in a settlement.  Our analysis
suggests that the brownfields problem may be more widespread than one
might infer from the prior literature.  Furthermore, the effects that we identify
may distort not only the decision to sell property subject to Superfund liability
but also any other decision of any PRP that could affect the number of PRPs at
the site, for example, a generator’s decision whether to transport its own
wastes or to have an independent firm transport those wastes.  Indeed, the
distortions that we identify may affect any decision by any party subject to any
regime of joint and several liability if that decision could affect the number of
other defendants liable for the same harm.  In Section III of this paper, we
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our analysis for law and
public policy.
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  21 See Kathleen Segerson, Liability Transfers: An Economic Assessment of Buyer and
Lender Liability, 25 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. S-46 (1993).
  22 See James Boyd, Winston Harrington & Molly K. Macauley, The Effects of
Environmental Liability on Industrial Real Estate Development, 12 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ.
37, 46-47 (1996).  Buyers can mitigate this problem by inspecting the site thoroughly before
purchasing the property.  See Percival et al., supra note 9, at 237 (noting that “in the great
majority of cases, site assessments generally have little difficulty determining that properties
are contaminated”).
I.  PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Economists have recognized that land prices may include discounts
reflecting environmental liability for cleanup of contaminated property.  Thus,
this liability need not affect the incentives for developers to buy these sites.
The previous economic literature identifies some possible reasons that a
transfer of liability to a party buying contaminated property may nevertheless
discourage efficient transactions.
First, Kathleen Segerson (1993) notes that if the buyer and the seller are
not equally likely to be judgment-proof, then a transfer of liability would
distort incentives to transfer the property from buyer to seller.21  Liability
would create too great an incentive to transfer the property to prospective
buyers that are more likely to be judgment-proof than the current owner and
too little incentive to transfer the property to prospective buyers that are less
likely to be judgment-proof than the current owner.  If the prospective buyer is
less likely to be judgment-proof than the current owner, then the proposed sale
would impose a greater expected liability cost on the buyer than the reduction
in the expected liability cost for the seller, and no price reduction could
compensate the buyer without imposing a net cost on the seller for the
transaction.  This net cost could discourage efficient transactions and
redevelopment of contaminated property.
Second, James Boyd, Winston Harrington, and Molly Macauley (1996)
note that if the seller is better informed than the buyer about the environmental
condition of the property, then this information asymmetry can create an
adverse selection problem that drives high-quality property from the market.22
Third, they also note that even if the buyer and seller are equally well
informed, the government’s ability to detect contaminated sites is imperfect,
and current owners may keep property off the market to avoid attracting the
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  23 See Boyd, Harrington & Macauley, supra note 22, at 49-52.
  24 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2000).
  25 Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1004, 42 U.S.C.§ 6903(3) (2000); see CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(29) (2000) (incorporating the definition from the Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1004 into
CERCLA).
attention of regulators to contamination at the site.23  If transactions increase
the probability of detection by regulators, then they increase the expected
liability costs associated with the property.  Once again, no price reduction
could compensate the buyer for the liability imposed without also imposing a
net cost on the seller for the transaction, which in turn could discourage
efficient redevelopment of contaminated property.
This paper identifies four additional reasons that Superfund liability could
discourage efficient transactions.  Superfund liability may have these effects
even if the buyer and seller are equally likely to be judgment-proof and have
the same information regarding contamination at the site and even if the
transaction has no effect on the probability of detection by regulators.  Each
effect implies a tendency for the expected costs imposed on the buyer to
exceed the reduction in the expected costs enjoyed by the seller.  That is, the
sale of the property would increase the expected costs for the buyer and the
seller taken together.  This increase in their collective costs, unlike a mere
transfer of liability from the seller to the buyer, could not be offset by an
adjustment in the sale price and therefore would inhibit sales of contaminated
properties.
All of the barriers to efficient transactions that we identify flow from the
following feature of Superfund liability:  If a PRP that owned the site “at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance” sells the property, then under
CERCLA, after such a sale, both the buyer and the seller are PRPs.24  That is,
the number of PRPs that the government can hold jointly and severally liable
increases upon such a sale of the property if the buyer was not already a PRP.
Furthermore, the law defines “disposal” broadly to include “the discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water.”25  Given this broad definition of
“disposal,” some courts have held prior owners liable even if they engaged in
no active disposal themselves if they owned the land while wastes previously
8 HOWARD F. CHANG and HILARY SIGMAN
  26 See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, 966 F.2d 837, 844-46 (4th Cir. 1992)
(upholding CERCLA liability for a passive prior owner), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940 (1992);
Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879-81 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that “disposal” under CERCLA does not include passive soil migration, but may include other
passive migration, such as from leaking barrels or tanks), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002).
But see United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2000) (limiting
“disposal” under CERCLA to spills occurring by human intervention); ABB Industrial Sys.
v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 357-59 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting CERCLA liability for a
passive prior owner); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713-18 (3d Cir. 1996)
(same); United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1350-53 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (same).
  27 See Hilary Sigman, Environmental Liability and Redevelopment of Old Industrial Land
(Rutgers University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 2006-09, 2006).
  28 See Howard F. Chang & Hilary Sigman, Incentives to Settle under Joint and Several
Liability:  An Empirical Analysis of Superfund Litigation, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 205 (2000).
deposited on the land continued to leak or spill during their ownership.26  The
broader the definition of “disposal,” the more likely courts are to hold prior
owners liable as PRPs, and the more likely each sale of the property is to
increase the number of PRPs.
Unlike the effects that we identify, the effects identified in the previous
literature would occur even if the seller could protect itself from all liability
through a sale of the property and transferred all liability to the buyer.
Furthermore, most of the effects that we identify are associated with the joint
and several liability imposed by Superfund, whereas the qualitative effects
identified in the previous literature flow more generally from the transfer of
liability to new owners, whether or not this liability is joint.  Thus, the effects
that we identify have different implications for law and public policy than
those identified in the previous literature.
Furthermore, Sigman (2006) presents empirical evidence that joint and
several liability in particular inhibits the development of contaminated sites.27
Those results suggest that joint and several liability reduces land prices and
increases vacancy rates in central cities.  This evidence is consistent with the
theory presented in this paper.
We will present our theory using a formal model of joint and several
liability based on the model we developed in Chang and Sigman (2000).28  Our
model allows us to study the effects of sales of contaminated property because
it allows us to vary the number of PRPs at a contaminated site.  This model
BROWNFIELDS 9
  29 See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact
of Joint and Several Liability, 23 J. Leg. Stud. 41 (1994).
  30 See Frank H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution among
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. &. Econ. 331, 356-60 (1980).
extended the models of joint and several liability developed earlier by Lewis
Kornhauser and Richard Revesz (1994), which assumed only two
defendants,29 and by Frank Easterbrook, William Landes, and Richard Posner
(1980), which assumed perfect correlation in outcomes at trial among all
defendants and costless litigation.30
II.  THEORY
Suppose that the government brings suit under CERCLA against all
available PRPs for cleanup costs at a contaminated site.  The government
litigates against N defendants, where N is an integer and N$1.  Suppose that all
defendants would share liability equally if they litigate and lose at trial.
Normalize the amount of damages at stake to equal one, so that if the
government were to prevail at trial against all N defendants, for example, each
would pay 1/N.  Let p represent the probability that the government prevails
against any given defendant, where 0<p<1.
Suppose the N defendants are divided into m groups of different types of
defendants, where m is an integer and 1#m#N.  The m groups may be of
unequal size.  Within each group, the outcomes at trial are perfectly correlated
across defendants.  Among the m groups, however, the outcomes at trial are
independent.  Thus, m is a variable that indicates the degree to which the
outcomes at trial are independent among the defendants: if m=1, then the
outcomes are perfectly correlated among all defendants, but if m=N, then the
outcomes are independent among all defendants.  In between these polar cases
is a range of cases with some mix of correlation and independence.
All parameters are common knowledge, so there is no asymmetric
information in this model.  We also assume that all N defendants can pay the
full amount of damages at stake, so none of these defendants is judgment-
proof.  Finally, we assume that a sale has no effect on the probability that the
government detects contamination at the site.  Under these assumptions,
according to models in the previous literature, the threat of liability imposed
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on buyers should not discourage the efficient transfer of contaminated
property to new owners.
Nevertheless, in our model, we can distinguish four different reasons that
the threat of Superfund liability would discourage sales of contaminated
property.  Each effect arises when a sale would increase the number of PRPs
from which the government can recover cleanup costs.  To illustrate the
separate contributions of each of these effects of Superfund liability, we will
begin with a simple version of the model, then introduce additional complexity
one step at a time.
A.  Other Liable Defendants
Suppose that N>1, so that the current owner is not the only defendant
associated with the site.  For simplicity, suppose also that m=1, so that the
outcomes at trial are perfectly correlated across all defendants.  In this case,
the expected liability for each defendant is p/N.
If a sale of the property increases the number of available defendants from
N=n to N=n+1 by adding the buyer as a new PRP, then the expected liability
of the buyer and the seller taken together increases from p/n to 2p/(n+1).  Let










which we can express as








An inspection of equation (2) confirms that if n>1, then this increase is
positive.
This increase in expected liability costs for the buyer and the seller as a
group will discourage even efficient transactions.  This effect arises because
the transaction reduces the collective expected liability of PRPs other than the
buyer and the seller.  Although the collective expected liability of all
defendants remains fixed and equal to p, that expected joint liability is now
divided among n+1 defendants rather than only n.
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  31 If we take the derivative of ∆ with respect to n, then we can confirm that the continuous
function ∆(n) expressed in equation (2) reaches a unique maximum somewhere between n=2
and n=3.
  32 Wernstedt, et al., supra note 7, at 8.
  33 By bringing contribution actions against other PRPs, a defendant can ensure that they bear
an equitable share of response costs even if the government has not filed suit against those
other PRPs.  Under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, a defendant that has
paid more than a pro rata share of a joint and several liability has a right to contribution from
another defendant that has paid less.  Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1(b)
(amended 1955), 12 U.L.A. 185, 194 (1996).  Under CERCLA, however, courts “may allocate
response costs among liable parties” when a private party seeks contribution from other PRPs
“using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)
(2000).
Given equation (2), we can show that the magnitude of this effect equals
zero at n=1, is at its greatest at n=2 or n=3, when ∆=p/6, then declines as n
grows larger, approaching zero as n goes to infinity.31  Thus, this effect is
especially important if N is small (but greater than one) before the sale.  Given
the small size of most brownfields, it is plausible that an owner contemplating
a sale would anticipate that there would be very few other PRPs available as
defendants in a potential lawsuit to recover cleanup costs.  A recent study
notes that these sites include a “large number of abandoned gas stations and
garages, former dry cleaning establishments, small fabrication facilities,
leaking underground storage tanks, and other facilities,” and estimates that the
size of the median brownfield site is probably one acre or less.32
The effect of a sale is also large if p is large, that is, if liability is likely.
For example, if n=3, the expected liability of the buyer and seller together rises
from p/3 to p/2, which amounts to a 50 percent increase in their collective
expected liability, and if p is close to one, this increase approaches one-sixth
of the cost of cleanup at the site.  Because we have normalized the amount of
damages at stake to equal one, the absolute value of this effect will also be
large insofar as the amount of damages at stake is large.
We can relax the assumption that each losing defendant pays its pro rata
share of the liability.33  Insofar as a sale of the property would add another
PRP to the site, and as long as this increase in the number of defendants tends
to reduce the share of liability paid by the defendants at trial other than the
buyer and the seller of the property, the sale would confer an expected benefit
external to the two parties to the sale transaction.  Because the allocation of
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this liability among the defendants is a zero-sum game, this external benefit
implies a transfer from the seller and buyer taken together.  The seller and
buyer can adjust the sales price to shift the expected burden of CERCLA
liability between themselves, but no price adjustment can capture the positive
externality that the sale produces for third parties that are already PRPs at the
site.  Because the loss for the seller and buyer is a pure transfer, this private
cost is not a social cost, and this positive externality implies that the level of
sales will be inefficiently low from a social perspective.  As long as n>1, there
will be such third-party beneficiaries, and this transfer of expected value to
third parties would tend to inhibit efficient transactions.
B.  Independent Outcomes at Trial
If we relax the assumption that outcomes at trial are perfectly correlated
across defendants, then we uncover a second reason that joint and several
liability under CERCLA can inhibit development of contaminated property.
This second effect arises even if the current owner is the only available
defendant before any sale of the contaminated site, so that n=1.  To see this
effect, suppose that n=1 so that there are only two defendants after a sale.  We
also assume that m=N, that is, the outcomes at trial for the defendants are
independent.
Under joint and several liability, the government need only prevail against
one defendant to recover in full.  The government will receive an amount
equal to one at trial unless it fails against each defendant.  Against each
defendant, the probability of failure is 1-p.  Therefore, the expected value of
the damages paid by the defendants as a group and awarded to the government
as a judgment at trial, which we denote D, is
D = 1 - (1 - p)m, (3)
which increases in m.  Thus, if a sale of a contaminated site increases m, then
the expected joint liability of the PRPs as a group will also increase as the
PRPs become a more diverse set of defendants.
For example, if the sale of a site adds a second defendant so that m=2, then
(3) implies that
D = 2p - p2, (4)
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  34 The value of m would have no effect on D, however, if p=0 or if p=1, that is, if the
outcomes are known in advance with certainty.  We can see from equation (3) that if p=0, then
the government would receive no award at trial, regardless of the value of m.  Similarly, we
can also see from equation (3) that if p=1, then the government would recover all of its
damages at trial, regardless of the value of m.
which is greater than the D = p that the government could recover when m=1.
The increase in the expected liability of the buyer and seller taken together is
the difference:
∆ = p - p2, (5)
which is positive, because (1 - p)p > 0 as long as 0 < p < 1, that is, as long as
there is some uncertainty about the outcomes at trial.34  If we take the
derivative of ∆(p) in equation (5) with respect to p, we can show that the
absolute value of this increase reaches a maximum at p=1/2, where ∆=1/4.  In
this case, a sale would increase the collective expected liability of the buyer
and seller by 50 percent, raising this expected liability by an amount equal to
25 percent of the cost of cleanup at the site.  Thus, the absolute value of this
effect will also be large when the amount of damages at stake is large.
As long as the outcome at trial for the buyer is not perfectly correlated with
the outcome at trial for the seller, then the expected joint liability of the buyer
and the seller as a group will increase upon sale of the property to a new
owner.  Given this weak assumption, the government would benefit from an
increase in the number of PRPs.  That is, joint and several liability would
create this effect even if we relax the assumption of independent outcomes at
trial and assumed some correlation instead, as long as the outcome at trial for
the new owner is not perfectly correlated with the outcome at trial for the prior
owner.
The magnitude of this effect, however, would depend upon the correlation
in trial outcomes.  If this correlation is positive, then the effect is smaller than
it would be if the outcomes were independent; if this correlation is negative
instead, then the effect is even greater than it would be if the outcomes were
independent.  The degree of correlation will also matter.  For example,
suppose the correlation is positive.  The weaker the correlation between the
outcome at trial for the buyer and the outcome at trial for the seller, the more
powerful will be the effect of the addition of the new owner as a PRP.
This effect would inhibit sale of the property even if the prospective seller
is the only available PRP associated with the site before any sale.  Given the
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  35 As long as there is at least one other defendant, this effect would be present.  As we have
seen, the larger the number of other defendants, the smaller the magnitude of the effect would
be.  The effect is at its maximum if there is one other defendant and the outcome for that
defendant is perfectly correlated with the outcome for the buyer and seller.  Once we relax the
assumption of perfect correlation in trial outcomes, however, the magnitude would also
depend on the degree of correlation among trial outcomes.  To the extent that outcomes for the
other defendants are independent of the outcome for the seller and buyer, so that m>1, those
other defendants are less likely to benefit from the addition of the buyer as a PRP.
small size of most brownfield sites, there may well be many cases in which an
owner would consider itself likely to be the only PRP available as a defendant
in a suit by the government to recover cleanup costs.  The effect that we
identify here could well deter many efficient transactions for such owners
contemplating sale of their properties.  In such cases, the government would
enjoy a positive externality as a result of a sale, and this external benefit
functions as a tax on the transaction.  The parties to the transaction may adjust
the sale price to shift the burden of their joint liability between the buyer and
seller, but this price adjustment cannot capture the external benefit conferred
upon the government.  Because this positive externality from the transaction is
a pure transfer to the government, this private cost for the defendants is not a
social cost, and there will be too few transactions from a social perspective.
Suppose we now relax the assumption that n=1 and turn to the general case
in which n$1, but we assume that the outcome at trial for the seller is
independent of the outcome at trial for the buyer.  With independent outcomes
at trial, we can obtain some combination of the first and second effects that we
have identified from an increase in N.  If these outcomes are perfectly
correlated instead, then only the first effect that we identified would be
possible.35  In cases where the new PRP would be found liable at trial along
with some other defendants, the government would not benefit, but the other
defendants would gain from having another defendant with which to share
liability.  As long as these beneficiaries include defendants other than the prior
owner that sold the property to the new PRP, the buyer and the seller as a
group would be worse off at trial as a result of the sale.
If the outcomes for the seller and buyer are independent, then the effect of
adding the buyer as a defendant depends on three states of the world at trial.
First, states in which the buyer would not be found liable, which occur with
probability 1-p, would not increase the expected liability for the buyer and the
seller as a group.  Second, states in which the seller and buyer would both be
found liable, which occur with probability p2, would deter transactions insofar
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as the presence of other liable defendants creates the first effect we have
identified.  The magnitude of this effect would depend on the probability that
there will be such other defendants and their number.36  Third, states in which
the buyer would be found liable but the seller would not, which occur with
probability (1-p)p, would also deter transactions insofar as other defendants
may also be found liable at trial.
As long as the outcome at trial for the buyer is not perfectly correlated with
the outcome at trial for any other defendant, however, this third state of the
world would also include a state in which the buyer alone would be found
liable.  This state would generate the second effect we have identified, which
produces an external benefit for the government instead of an external benefit
for other defendants.  In cases where the new PRP would be found liable at
trial while no other defendants are found liable, the government would benefit
from having another PRP to sue.
The benefit conferred upon the government by an increase in m would
represent an additional effect of Superfund liability discouraging efficient
sales.  Given equation (3), we can take the derivative of D with respect to m





p p m= − − −ln( )( ) .1 1
Given equation (6), we can confirm that this derivative is positive for 0<p<1.
We can also see that the magnitude of this effect falls as m grows larger and
the set of defendants becomes more diverse.  Therefore, this effect would be
most important when m is small.  Given the small size of most brownfield
sites, the number of PRPs and thus m will often be small, which implies a
significant effect from an increase in m.
If n>1 and m increases, then a sale not only increases the expected joint
liability to be paid by the PRPs as a group to the government but also increases
the share of that expected joint cost that the buyer and the seller as a group
may expect to bear.  That is, even when we allow m>1, the first effect that we
identified persists.  As a result of both effects, the sale would increase the
liability costs that the parties to the sale would expect to pay in subsequent
litigation.
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  37 See Lloyd S. Dixon, The Transaction Costs Generated by Superfund’s Liability Approach,
in Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science, and Law 171, 179, 183 (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds. 1995) [hereinafter Analyzing Superfund].
  38 See id. at 177.  For example, a 1993 RAND study found that this share rises by 25 percent
when we move from sites with cleanup costs greater than $75 million to sites with cleanup
costs less than $3 million.  See Lloyd S. Dixon, Deborah S. Drezner & James K. Hammitt,
Superfund: Private Sector Expenditures and Transaction Costs 37 (1993).
C.  Litigation Costs
The foregoing analysis did not include litigation costs in the costs that the
prospective buyer and seller would anticipate while contemplating a sale of the
property.  Suppose, for example, that a trial would impose cd in litigation costs
on each defendant, where cd>0.  If a sale adds the buyer to the set of
defendants without removing the seller from that set, then the litigation costs
imposed on the buyer and seller as a group would double, rising from cd to 2cd
as a result of the sale.  The magnitude of this increase equals cd, so that this
effect will be more important when cd is large, that is, when litigation costs per
defendant are large.  Like the increase in the expected liability for cleanup
costs, this increase in litigation costs for the buyer and the seller as a group
would discourage the sale of the property, whether N=1 or N>1 prior to any
sale.
The empirical evidence indicates that the transaction costs flowing from
Superfund liability are large.  These costs include not only legal fees but also
other costs, including engineering studies to contest a remedy proposed by the
government or to build a case against another PRP.  A 1994 RAND study of
Superfund sites estimated that transaction costs accounted for 32 percent of
private-sector PRP expenditures through 1991, with cleanup costs accounting
for the other 68 percent.37  That is, these transaction costs were equal to nearly
half of the cost of cleanup itself.  Furthermore, the data collected by RAND
also show that at sites with relatively low cleanup costs, transaction costs
accounted for a larger share of expenditures than at those with higher cleanup
costs, other factors held constant.38  The median brownfield site is small and
likely to have cleanup costs that are low compared to the sites studied by
RAND, even if these costs are large compared to the value of the property.
These facts suggest that the share of expenditures that owners expect to devote
to transaction costs at most brownfields are even higher than suggested by the
RAND estimates, which were based on sites on the National Priorities List.
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  39 See Dixon, supra note 37, at 176-77.  For example, a 1992 RAND study found that this
share at sites with only one PRP was only 7 percent, compared to 39 percent for sites with
multiple PRPs, and holding other site attributes constant, this difference came to 34 percent.
See Jan Paul Acton & Lloyd S. Dixon, Superfund and Transaction Costs:  The Experience of
Insurers and Very Large Industrial Firms 51, 52, 61 (1992).  Similarly, a 1993 RAND study
found that holding other site attributes constant, this share increased by 35 percent when we
move from sites with one PRP to sites with 2 to 15 PRPs, by 29 percent when we move from
sites with 15 or fewer PRPs to sites with 16 to 100 PRPs, and by 6 percent when we move
from sites with 16 to 100 PRPs to sites with more than 100 PRPs.  See Dixon, Drezner &
Hammitt, supra note 38, at 37.  In terms of our model, an increase in this share from 7 percent
for a site with one PRP to 42 percent for a site with 2 to 15 PRPs, for example, would amount
to an increase in litigation costs from 8 percent of the cost of cleanup to 72 percent of the cost
of cleanup.
The prospect of litigation would inhibit property sales even if we relax the
assumption that the defendants’ total litigation costs are proportional to the
number of defendants.  As long as a sale causes an increase in the collective
litigation costs of the buyer and the seller through the addition of another
defendant, as seems plausible, then this effect would inhibit such transactions.
This increase in litigation costs seems plausible for any regime that makes
both the buyer and seller liable, whether or not the liability is joint and several.
This increase in litigation costs seems especially likely to be large, however,
under regimes of joint and several liability like that imposed by CERCLA,
where each defendant may litigate not only the issue of its own liability but
also the issue of an equitable apportionment of joint liability among the
defendants.  The RAND data confirm that transaction costs as a share of PRP
expenditures increase as the number of PRPs increases, holding other factors
constant, and this increase appears to be the most dramatic for sites with
relatively few PRPs.39  Given the small size of the typical brownfield site,
there are likely to be few PRPs available as defendants, and the deterrent effect
of an increase in litigation costs is likely to be significant.
Furthermore, the RAND data understate the litigation costs that are
relevant for our model.  The cd in our model include the costs the PRPs would
bear if the government were to litigate the case and obtain a judgment in court
for each defendant.  Given that most cases settle out of court, the RAND data
do not include all the litigation costs that can deter the sale of brownfields,
because the mere threat of these litigation costs undermines the bargaining
position of defendants in settlement negotiations and implies less favorable
settlements for these defendants.  Once we take account of settlement
negotiations, as we will do next, these potential litigation costs translate into
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larger transfers to the government in settlements to pay for cleanup costs.
Thus, the deterrent effect of litigation costs is probably much larger than
suggested by the RAND data.
If sales of brownfields inevitably entail an increase in these transaction
costs, then we might deem it appropriate from the standpoint of economic
efficiency that owners refrain from sales to avoid these costs insofar as these
costs are social costs and not merely private costs for the PRPs.  To the extent
that proposed reforms of the liability regime can reduce these costs, however,
the tendency for these costs to deter transactions that are otherwise efficient
militates in favor of those reforms.  Furthermore, as we will see next,
settlement negotiations tend to convert the defendant’s litigation costs into
transfers to the government, so that these costs operate as a tax on transactions.
This tax serves to deter efficient transactions, because the private costs
imposed on the buyer and seller are not social costs.
D.  Settlements
So far we have assumed that the government would litigate against all
defendants rather than settle out of court with any defendants.  The three
effects we have identified so far all would make such litigation more costly for
the seller and buyer of a brownfield site taken together, which would tend to
deter a sale.  To complete the analysis, we must explore the extent to which
these three deterrent effects persist once we allow for the possibility of a
settlement.  Unfortunately, the analysis of settlement negotiations among a
plaintiff and N defendants is quite complex, and the existing literature does not
include a comprehensive analysis deriving the equilibrium for a bargaining
game in a completely general case.  Instead, this literature had identified
equilibria in specific bargaining games with restrictive assumptions that render
the problem tractable.  While we make a modest contribution to the extension
of prior results to more general models, our primary contribution here is to
provide a synthesis of the solutions derived in the existing literature for special
cases and to explore the general lessons that we can draw from those cases for
the problem of brownfields.
Once we allow for settlement negotiations, we find that each of the three
effects that we have already identified can continue to deter sales of
brownfield sites.  This result is not surprising, because these effects all shift
the threat point in such negotiations against the buyer and seller of a
brownfield site.  Furthermore, we find that settlement negotiations can add yet
BROWNFIELDS 19
  40 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000).  Daniel Klerman, Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits:
The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules, 25 J. Legal Stud. 445 (1996), refers to such a
setoff rule as an “unconditional” pro tanto setoff rule, because the court applies this setoff
without inquiring into whether the settling defendants were actually liable.
another reason for the risk of Superfund liability to inhibit development of
contaminated property:  an increase in the number of defendants may increase
the government’s ability to exploit a “prisoner’s dilemma” among the
defendants in a race to settle with the government.
1.  Correlated Outcomes at Trial
An increase in the number of defendants would increase the total amount
that the government could extract in a settlement with the defendants as a
group.  This effect is not just an implication of the effects we have already
discussed:  this effect is present even if N=1 prior to a sale, even if outcomes at
trial are perfectly correlated, and even if litigation is costless for the
defendants.  To illustrate this effect and to develop the basic intuition, we
begin with a simple case.  To see this effect isolated from the other effects that
we have identified, we first assume that the owner is the only available PRP
before a sale (n=1), outcomes at trial are perfectly correlated among all
defendants (m=1), and litigation is costless (cd=0).  All parties are risk neutral,
and each seeks to maximize its expected payoff.
a.  Two Defendants and Zero Litigation Costs.  With perfectly correlated
trial outcomes, the government can expect to recover D=p at trial regardless of
the number of defendants and could settle for that amount.  If N>1, however,
then the government can do better than that in settlement negotiations.
Suppose a sale increases the number of defendants from N=1 to N=2, then
consider what happens if the government settles with one defendant for an
amount s.  Under CERCLA’s “pro tanto” setoff rule, if a defendant settles with
the government, then the court reduces the government’s claim against any
nonsettling defendants by the amount paid by the settling defendant in the
settlement.40  Therefore, the government’s claim against the nonsettling
defendant would have an expected value of (1-s)p, which the government
could either obtain through litigation or extract in a subsequent settlement with
the second defendant.  As a result of this strategy, the government would
obtain s + (1-s)p, which equals
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  41 CERCLA protects a settling PRP from contribution actions brought by other PRPs.  See
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000).
  42 This strategy is based on the bargaining process described by Easterbrook, Landes &
Posner, supra note 30, at 356-60.  As noted by Kornhauser and Revesz, supra note 29, at 70
n.63, the “bargaining model is not fully specified” in the description by Easterbrook, Landes,
and Posner.  We provide a more complete specification, making explicit the features implicit
p + (1 - p)s. (7)
As long as s>0 and p<1, this payoff is greater than the p that the government
could have obtained by litigating against both PRPs or by litigating against a
single PRP in the absence of a second PRP.  The government gains because it
gets s for certain in a settlement and loses s through the setoff only in the state
of the world in which it prevails at trial.  Therefore, the government would
rather settle with at least one defendant for any positive amount than litigate
with both.
The government could, for example, settle with one defendant for an
amount equal to that defendant’s expected liability if the government were to
litigate against both defendants, so that s=p/2.  The government would then
expect to get (1-s)p = p - p2/2 from the second defendant, either through
litigation or a subsequent settlement, which is greater than the p/2 that it could
have expected from the second defendant if the government had litigated
against both.  Thus, this settlement makes the government better off at the
expense of the nonsettling defendant.  With this settlement, the nonsettling
defendant suffers because its gain from the setoff is too small to compensate
for the loss flowing from the absence of another defendant with which to share
liability for any award at trial.41
The government can do still better, however, if it can settle for a larger
amount with the first defendant.  We can see from the expression in (7) that
the government would prefer a larger settlement amount, because the
government’s payoff is increasing in the settlement amount s.  The
government can extract a better settlement with the first defendant by
exploiting the negative externality that a settlement would generate for the
nonsettling defendant.
In particular, suppose that the government announces that it will settle with
one defendant before negotiating with the other defendant over a second
settlement, and then holds an auction to determine which defendant will settle
with the government first.42  The government invites the defendants to submit
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  43 We assume that the government can commit itself to its bargaining strategy.  Similarly,
Kornhauser and Revesz, supra note 29, at 58 n.45, assume that the plaintiff can commit itself
to litigate against any defendant that rejects a settlement offer.  These assumptions seem
especially reasonable in the Superfund context, in which the plaintiff (the government) is an
extreme example of a repeat player that has much to gain by building a reputation for carrying
out the threats that it makes in the course of settlement negotiations.
bids simultaneously and announces that it will settle with the highest bidder
for the amount offered by that bidder.43  The government also announces that
if the defendants submit the same bid, the government would settle with one
defendant chosen at random before negotiating with the other defendant
regarding a second settlement.  If the defendants compete to settle first, each
defendant increases its bid along a continuous action space until the proposed
settlement amount is large enough to make it indifferent between settling first
and settling second.  Each will stop at that point, because bidding any higher
would lead each to strictly prefer not to settle first, and both submit the same
bid.  Only this pair of identical bids is a Nash equilibrium of this bargaining
game.  This equilibrium occurs when the setoff is large enough to compensate
the nonsettling defendant for the loss of another defendant with which to share
liability, thereby eliminating the negative externality from the first settlement.
At the equilibrium settlement amount,
s = (1 - s)p. (8)







which is also the expected liability of the nonsettling defendant if the
government were to litigate after settling with the first defendant for this
amount.  Therefore, in equilibrium, the government can settle with each
defendant in sequence for the same amount s.
This equilibrium maximizes the government’s payoff.  The government
can do no better by settling with both defendants simultaneously.  Suppose
settlement negotiations take the form of the following bargaining game.
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Suppose that the government makes “take it or leave it” offers to settle with
the defendants for the amounts s1 and s2, with defendant i paying si, where
0#si#1 and i = 1, 2.  The defendants receive their offers simultaneously, and
each must either accept the offer and pay si in a settlement or reject the offer.
The defendants respond simultaneously, independently, and non-cooperatively
to the plaintiff’s settlement offer.  Each party seeks to maximize its expected
payoff within the constraints of this framework.
Consider a defendant’s decision whether to accept such a settlement offer
or to litigate instead.  It would be a Nash equilibrium for each defendant to
accept the offer if each defendant expects litigating against the government
alone (after the other defendant has accepted its offer) to yield an expected
liability at least equal to  si.  For example, defendant 1 would calculate the
expected payoff from rejecting an offer to settle for s1 when defendant 2 has
accepted its offer, taking into account the setoff that a court would apply as a
result of defendant 2 settling for s2.  If defendant 1 rejects the settlement offer
and chooses instead to litigate alone, then it would face a probability of p of
being held liable for 1-s2 in damages.  Therefore, for defendant 1 to accept the
offer to settle, s1 # (1-s2)p is a necessary condition.  To maximize its payoff,
the government would choose the largest amount s1 that satisfies this
condition, which yields:
 s1 = (1-s2)p (10)
as the optimal offer for the government.  By similar reasoning,
 s2 = (1-s1)p. (11)





as the largest amount that the government could obtain from each defendant in
a settlement with both.  That is, for each defendant, the government would
propose the same settlement amount s that appears in equation (9), which the
government could have obtained through the auction described earlier.
It would be a Nash equilibrium for both defendants to accept this offer.
Kornhauser and Revesz note that it is also a Nash equilibrium for both
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  44 See Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 29, at 64.
  45 Others have observed the same two Nash equilibria in models similar to the model used
by Kornhauser and Revesz.  See Marcel Kahan, The Incentive Effects of Settlements under
Joint and Several Liability, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 389, 391 n.7 (1996); A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction among Antitrust Defendants:  An
Economic Analysis, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 447, 470-71 (1981).
  46 If p=0, then the government would be certain to lose at trial and would be unable to
recover any of its cleanup costs in a settlement, regardless of the number of defendants, so that
an increase in N would have no effect.  If p=1 instead, then the defendants would be certain
to lose at trial, and the government would be able to recover all of its cleanup costs in a
settlement, regardless of the number of defendants, so that an increase in N would have no
effect.
defendants to reject this offer and litigate instead, and that the litigation
equilibrium is Pareto superior to the settlement equilibrium for the
defendants.44  Rejecting the offer yields a better outcome for the defendants,
however, only because Kornhauser and Revesz assume that litigation against
both defendants is the government’s only threat in the event that both
defendants reject the offer.45  In a more general model, the government could
threaten to hold the auction described earlier, which would yield the same
settlement amounts, s = p/(p+1) for each defendant, as the amounts proposed
by the government in its offer.  With this auction as the threat in the event both
reject the offer, the government can obtain the maximum possible settlement,
s = p/(p+1), from each defendant.  If at least one defendant accepts the
government’s offer, then the government can obtain this amount without
actually holding the auction.
The buyer and seller as a group are worse off after a sale because the
increase in the number of defendants creates a prisoner’s dilemma in
settlement negotiations, which effects a transfer to the government.  The
amount that the government can extract from them increases from p to










which is positive as long as 0<p<1.46  By taking the derivative of ∆(p) in
equation (13) with respect to p, we can show that this increase reaches a
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  47 See Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 30, at 356-60.  We can, for example,
consider a sequence of N settlements with one defendant at a time, after N–1 auctions to see
which defendant will settle next.  By using backward induction, we can show that each
defendant will submit the same bid in each auction, and the settlement amount proposed in
each bid equals the expected liability of the last nonsettling defendant if it litigates alone
against the government.  This equilibrium yields the maximum payoff for the government.
  48 Note that this result does not depend on an assumption that each defendant would pay a
pro rata share of damages awarded at trial:  because each defendant faces the threat of
litigating alone, each would pay the same amount in a settlement even if defendants would pay
unequal amounts at a trial in which multiple defendants were to lose.
maximum at p=0.4142, when the amount paid to the government increases
from 0.4142 to 0.5858.  In this case, a sale causes a 41 percent increase in the
value of the transfer to the government, an increase equal to 17 percent of the
cost of cleanup.
b.  Other Defendants and Litigation Costs.  Now we allow the number of
PRPs prior to a sale, n, to be greater than one.  As shown by Easterbrook,
Landes, and Posner of the University of Chicago, the same reasoning we used
in the case of two defendants also applies to the more general case of
settlement negotiations with N defendants.47  Each defendant settles for the
same amount s, which equals the expected liability of a nonsettling defendant
litigating alone against the government after all the other N–1 defendants have
settled for the same amount s.48  We can extend their result further by
introducing positive litigation costs equal to cd>0 for each defendant.  Note
that a court would hold a lone nonsettling defendant liable for 1-(N-1)s with
probability p, and the defendant would also bear cd in litigation costs.
Therefore, each defendant would settle for the amount s that solves the
following equation:
s = [1 - (N - 1)s]p +  cd. (14)








as the equilibrium settlement.  We will refer to this outcome as the Chicago
settlement.
Although this settlement amount is decreasing in N, the total amount

























is positive as long as p<1, that is, as long as the defendants are not certain to
lose at trial.
Note that both s and S increase in cd, because the government can extract
more from each defendant in a settlement if each faces the prospect of large
litigation costs if it goes to trial alone.  As long as we assume that litigation
costs and N are not too large, specifically, that
cdN < (1 - p), (18)
then S<1.  That is, under these conditions, the defendants will be willing to pay
less than the full amount at stake in a settlement, and the government could
recover more of its cleanup costs through settlements if either N or cd
increases.
Thus, we see that if a sale of a contaminated site increases the number of
PRPs available for the government to sue, then it will increase the maximum
amount that the government can extract in a settlement with the defendants.
We also see that if there are other defendants with which the buyer and seller
may share liability (that is, if n>1), increases in N also generate a benefit for
each of these other defendants, because each one pays a smaller amount in a
settlement as N increases.  In such a case, the fourth effect that we have
identified accompanies a modified version of the first effect we identified,
insofar as a sale of the site generates a positive externality for defendants other
than the seller and buyer.  Given that the allocation of cleanup costs among the
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parties is a zero-sum game, these positive externalities for these other
defendants and for the government imply transfers from the seller and buyer as
a group.  Like the second effect we identified, the benefit for the government
from increases in N would function as a tax on sales of contaminated property,
which would tend to discourage the efficient development of these sites.
We can confirm an adverse effect of a sale for the buyer and the seller as a
group in this more general N-defendant case if we consider an increase from
N=n to N=n+1.  Substituting n+1 and n for N in our expression for the
settlement amount s, we can express the increase in the amount that the seller


















( )[ ( ) ]
[( ) ]( )




which is positive.  We can see from equation (20), however, that the
magnitude of this effect approaches zero as n goes to infinity, so that the
deterrent effect of an increase in N is most important when there are relatively
few PRPs from which the government may recover cleanup costs.
Finally, we can also see from equation (20) that the magnitude of this
effect increases in the defendants’ litigation costs cd.  Thus, our earlier
calculation of the maximum possible magnitude of this effect in the n=1 case,
based on our assumption that cd=0, would be an underestimate of that
maximum possible effect.  One should not confuse this effect of litigation
costs with the third effect of an increase in N that we have identified.  Here
litigation costs instead magnify the fourth effect that we have identified.  This
magnifying effect depends only on the cost of litigating against the
government alone, not on the magnitude of the increase in the defendants’
collective litigation costs when N increases.  The effect of an increase in N is
large here if cd is large, simply because the government can extract more from
the buyer in a settlement if each defendant faces the prospect of large litigation
costs if it goes to trial alone.  Thus, if those litigation costs are large, then the
deterrent effect of an increase in N on sales is magnified, regardless of the
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effect of an increase in N on the total litigation costs of the defendants as a
group.
2.  Independent Outcomes at Trial
Next we turn to the case of independent trial outcomes.  To develop the
basic intuition for the results here, we will assume independent trial outcomes
among all N defendants (m=N) and begin with the simple case of only one
PRP prior to a sale (n=1) and zero litigation costs (cd=0).  In this case, as we
can see from equation (4), the government expects to recover D = (2-p)p if it
litigates against both defendants.  This expected payoff is greater than the p the
government could expect from litigating against both defendants in the case of
perfectly correlated outcomes, because 2-p>1.  That is, litigation against both
defendants becomes more attractive for the government as the correlation in
trial outcomes falls.
In this case, the government can still settle using the bargaining strategies
discussed earlier and obtain p/(1+p) from each defendant.  That equilibrium
settlement amount does not depend on the value of m at all, as each defendant
considers the prospect of litigating against the government by itself after the
other defendant settles, when there would be no other defendant that might
also lose at trial and share liability.  With independent outcomes at trial,
however, the government’s maximum payoff from settlement is no longer
greater than its payoff from litigating against both defendants.  Instead, the
government would receive less by settling than it could expect to recover by









which we can show is true if and only if 0 < p(1-p).  Thus, this result holds as
long as there is some uncertainty regarding the outcomes at a trial (that is, as
long as 0<p<1).
To see the same point another way, consider what would happen if the
government were to settle with one defendant for the expected liability of that
defendant if the government were to litigate against both defendants instead,
that is, for s = (2-p)p/2.  Because this amount (unlike the p/2 we considered in
the case of perfect correlation among trial outcomes) is larger than the
equilibrium settlement amount, p/(p+1), a nonsettling defendant would enjoy
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  49 See Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 29, at 52-53.  Assuming that defendants losing at
trial would pay equal shares, we extend this result from the case of two defendants to the more
general case of N defendants with independent outcomes at trial.  See Appendix.  In this case,
the government would again choose to litigate against all defendants rather than settle with
any.
a positive externality from such a large settlement.  The setoff from such a
settlement is so large, and the loss to a nonsettling defendant from being
deprived of the opportunity to share liability with the settling defendant is so
small (because the chance that the defendants would share liability at trial is
reduced with independent outcomes), that the nonsettling defendant’s
prospects actually improve with such a settlement.  Given this positive
externality, each defendant would prefer that the other defendant settle first for
such a large amount.  Furthermore, given that the allocation of cleanup costs is
a zero-sum game, we know that the gain from such a settlement for the
nonsettling defendant is a loss for the government.  Therefore, it would not be
a Nash equilibrium for the defendants to accept a settlement offer from the
government for any amount large enough to compensate the government for
the lost opportunity to litigate against both defendants.  Kornhauser and
Revesz conclude that under these circumstances, the government would
choose to litigate against both defendants rather than settle with either or with
both.49
Now relax the assumption that n=1, and suppose that litigation costs are
strictly positive for all parties rather than zero.  Litigation would impose a cost
cp on the plaintiff and a cost cd on each defendant, where cp>0 and cd>0.  The
government now has an incentive to settle, because it would like to avoid its
litigation costs.  Furthermore, as we have seen, litigation costs for the
defendants increases the maximum amount that the government can extract
from them in a settlement.  Note that the government would settle for an
amount S from all the defendants rather than litigate against all of them only if
S $ Sp, (22)
where Sp represents the government’s expected payoff from litigating against
all N defendants.  That is, Sp = D - cp, or:
Sp = 1 - (1 - p)m - cp. (23)
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  50 See Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 29, at 48-49.
  51 See John J. Donohue III, The Effect of Joint and Several Liability on the Settlement Rate
– Mathematical Symmetries and Metaissues about Rational Litigant Behavior: Comment on
Kornhauser and Revesz, 23 J. Legal Stud. 543, 555-56 (1994).
If litigation costs are large enough, the maximum amount S that the
government can obtain in a settlement may exceed Sp, which would imply a
settlement instead of litigation against all defendants.
Even when the payoff from a Chicago settlement is less than Sp, however,
the government would avoid litigation if we relax an assumption that has been
implicit in our analysis so far.  Kornhauser and Revesz make this assumption
explicitly, which prevents the government from making a settlement offer that
binds the parties only if all defendants accept the offer.50  As John Donohue
points out, if we allow the government to make settlement offers that are
contingent on acceptance by all defendants, then the government can settle
with all defendants, even in cases in which the amount that would result from
a Chicago settlement is less than Sp because outcomes at trial are
independent.51  That is, such offers allow the government to avoid the obstacle
to settlement that flows from joint and several liability and the pro tanto setoff
rule because these offers eliminate the possibility that nonsettling defendants
could enjoy a positive externality from the government settling with other
defendants for large amounts.
Indeed, if the government can make these offers on a “take it or leave it”
basis, so that the government litigates against all defendants if any defendant
rejects the offer, then the government can capture the entire surplus produced
for the parties by avoiding litigation costs.  The government could offer to
settle with each defendant for an amount equal to the defendant’s litigation
costs plus its expected liability if the government litigates against all
defendants.  The government would thereby receive
S = 1 - (1 - p)m + Ncd (24)
from all the defendants together, yielding a total settlement greater than Sp.
We will refer to this outcome as a Donohue settlement.  In such a settlement,
each defendant pays what it would expect to pay in the event that the
government litigates against all defendants.  Therefore, this settlement would
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preserve all of the first three deterrent effects we described as flowing from an
increase in N.
3.  Implications for the General Case
What lessons can we draw from these special cases for the more general
case that allows for asymmetric relationships among trial outcomes for the
defendants (1<m<N)?  Given the option of a Donohue settlement and the
presence of positive litigation costs, settlements would always occur under our
assumptions, and the government can always extract an amount equal to its
expected recovery D from litigation against all N defendants plus the total
litigation costs that the defendants would bear from going to trial.  Under the
Donohue settlement, a sale of a brownfield site could still trigger all of the first
three deterrent effects that we have outlined by adding another PRP that the
government can sue.
As we have seen, however, if outcomes among defendants are sufficiently
correlated, then the government can extract even more by exploiting a race
among the defendants to settle first.  Thus, the government would obtain at
least the Donohue settlement amount and may do even better in some cases.
In a Chicago settlement, the fourth effect that we identify would replace the
second and third effects that we identify, although the first effect persists in a
modified form.  Under the Chicago settlement, an increase in N effects a
transfer to the government either by creating a race to settle where none
existed before or by increasing the government’s yield from exploiting such a
race.  More generally, the optimal strategy for the government may include the
use of both Chicago auctions and Donohue settlements in some combination.
Let Sd represent the total amount that the government receives using the
optimal settlement strategy.  Positive litigation costs and the option of a
Donohue settlement together ensure that Sp<Sd.
In any event, we would generally expect the sale of a brownfield site to
effect a transfer from the seller and buyer as a group through at least one of
these various effects we have identified.  Without solving for the bargaining
equilibrium in the general case for all possible circumstances, however, we
cannot rule out the possibility that in some perverse cases the seller and buyer
as a group might instead enjoy a net gain from the increase in N flowing from
the sale of a brownfield site.  Nevertheless, our analysis leads us to believe that
such cases, if they occur, would be unusual exceptions to the general rule.
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Some general observations support our conclusion that the seller and buyer are
likely to effect a transfer to other parties through a sale of a brownfield site.
First, an increase in N would generally increase transfers to the government
and could never decrease them.  If the addition of a defendant were ever to
worsen the government’s prospects somehow, then the government could
always settle with that defendant for a nominal amount and thereby remove
that defendant from the bargaining game.  Normally, we would expect an
increase in N to improve the government’s prospects instead, through some
combination of the effects that we identify.  Thus, an increase in N flowing
from a sale would generally increase the amount extracted by the government
from the defendants collectively, including the buyer that has become the new
PRP.
Given this observation, it seems likely that the buyer and seller as a group
would transfer wealth to other parties through the sale.  We know the expected
liability and potential litigation costs for the buyer has increased through the
sale, as long as the buyer was not already a PRP prior to the sale.  For the
buyer and seller as a group to enjoy a net gain from an increase in N despite
the adverse effects for the buyer, the seller would have to gain enough to offset
the loss for the buyer.  For the seller to gain this much, it must enjoy an
unusually large gain from the addition of the buyer as a PRP.  The average
PRP prior to a sale would certainly not gain that much from the sale, because
if the government gains from the addition of the buyer as a PRP, then all n of
the original PRPs, including the seller, together do not gain enough to offset
the loss to the buyer.  Thus, it would be a rare case indeed in which the seller
alone would gain enough to allow the buyer and seller to gain as a group from
the addition of the buyer as a PRP.
The preceding analysis has assumed that the defendants do not cooperate in
their negotiations with the government, which can therefore extract the full
surplus generated by a settlement for the parties.  We can instead relax the
assumptions that only the government can make “take it or leave it” settlement
offers and that the defendants respond independently without cooperating with
one another.  A more general model might allow the defendants to exercise
some bargaining power in settlement negotiations, so that settlements do not
necessarily allow the government to extract the maximum possible amount
from the defendants.  Instead, we might assume that when a settlement is
possible (Sp<Sd), the settlement that emerges from successful negotiations
would fall somewhere in the possible settlement range, with the expected
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value of the settlement amount determined by the parties’ relative bargaining
power:
S = αSp + (1 - α)Sd, (25)
where α is a variable reflecting the defendants’ relative bargaining power, and
0#α#1.
Suppose, for example, that with probability α, the defendants make a “take
it or leave it” offer to the government, and with probability 1-α, the
government makes a “take it or leave it” offer to the defendants.  If the
defendants make the offer, we would expect Sp as the settlement amount.  If
the government makes the offer, we would generally expect Sd instead as the
settlement amount.
If α is a fixed parameter, then we would still expect an increase in N to lead
to an increase in the settlement amount S, which is a weighted average of Sp
and Sd, because an increase in N would generally increase Sd.  If the
defendants’ litigation costs are large, then this effect would be especially
significant.  Moreover, if the addition of a new PRP also causes m to rise, then
Sp would also increase, adding still another reason for the settlement amount S
to increase.  For the reasons we have discussed, this increase in the settlement
amount makes it likely that the seller and the buyer make themselves worse off
as a group by increasing the number of PRPs.
Furthermore, if α is a function of N rather than a fixed parameter, then we
would generally expect an increase in N to cause α to fall.  That is, we would
expect the derivative of α with respect to N to be negative:
αN(N) < 0. (26)
A larger number of defendants seems likely to reduce the defendants’
bargaining power by making cooperation among them in settlement
negotiations more difficult.  If the defendants’ relative bargaining power falls
with N, then the resulting settlement in equation (25) would move away from
Sp and up toward Sd, thereby reducing the defendants’ payoff still more.
For all these reasons, the addition of a new PRP would usually shift
settlements in favor of the government.  This transfer of expected value to the
government would tend to make the buyer and the seller as a group worse off
after a sale in most cases.  This effect would thereby discourage even efficient
sales of contaminated property, because an adjustment in the sale price could
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not capture the benefits derived by the government or by PRPs other than the
seller and buyer from the sale.
III.  CONCLUSION
We distinguish four different reasons for Superfund liability to discourage
the purchase of contaminated property.  These four effects all arise because a
sale may increase the number of defendants in a suit to recover cleanup costs.
First, a sale may increase the share of liability that a seller and a buyer may
expect to pay as a group.  Second, a sale may increase the amount of damages
that the government can expect to recover at trial.  Third, a sale may increase
the total litigation costs that a seller and a buyer may face as a group.  Fourth,
a sale may increase the amount that the government can expect to extract in a
settlement with the PRPs.  Each of these effects may interfere with the
efficient redevelopment of contaminated sites.
Our analysis also identifies circumstances in which the four distorting
effects we identify are most likely to be significant.  Most of these
circumstances would not seem relevant if the deterrent effects of Superfund
liability derived only from the circumstances identified in the previous
literature.  If the defendants face large litigation costs, for example, the
magnitudes of the third and fourth effects that we identify will be large.
Furthermore, the magnitudes of all four effects that we describe will be large
when the number of PRPs is small (although the first effect is absent entirely if
the buyer and seller are the only available defendants).  Finally, all these
effects are largest when a sale is most likely to increase the number of liable
PRPs, that is, when both the buyer and seller are likely to be liable as PRPs
after the sale.
We have noted empirical evidence suggesting that at least some of these
effects are likely to be important at most brownfield sites.  At many such sites,
owners contemplating a sale are likely to regard themselves as the only PRP
available or only one of two or three available PRPs, and we have shown that
the effects we identify will be especially large under those circumstances.  We
suspect that at least one of these four effects is an important deterrent to sales
at most such sites, with the first and third effects likely to be significant at
many such sites, and the second and fourth effects likely to be significant at
some sites.  We have also discussed how our results are likely to be robust to a
wide variety of changes in the assumptions of our formal model.  The
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  52 Efforts to provide relief to buyers may fall short of such certainty because they require the
buyer to meet various conditions in order to qualify for relief.  Under the Brownfields Act, for
example, a “bona fide prospective purchaser” must establish that it has exercised “appropriate
care with respect to hazardous substances found at the facility” in order to avoid liability.  42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(40) (West Supp. 2005).
  53 A more general model would allow each defendant to have its own individual probability
pi of losing at trial, where i = 1, ..., N.  To the extent that a new PRP is unlikely to be held
liable, so that its pi is small, the addition of that PRP would have little effect on the payoffs
that we analyze in our model.  Thus, reforms that reduce the probability of liability for a new
PRP would mitigate the deterrent effects we identify.  These effects would remain significant,
however, insofar as the probability of liability for a new owner remains high.
possibility of settlements, for example, not only preserves the possibility of the
first three effects that we identify but also adds the fourth effect as yet another
possible deterrent to sales of brownfield sites.
The four effects that we identify suggest some disadvantages associated
with joint and several liability under CERCLA.  These effects provide some
support for efforts to restrict the scope of this joint and several liability.  These
efforts include, for example, the efforts of the EPA, Congress, and the states to
protect purchasers from Superfund liability.  If a buyer knows for certain that
it would not be liable, then the effects we identify are absent entirely.52  If the
buyer is likely not to be liable, then the expected magnitude of these effects
will be small.  Thus, by reducing or eliminating the probability that a
purchaser would be liable, these policies avoid or mitigate the deleterious
effects that the threat of Superfund liability can have on the incentives to buy
contaminated property.53  The less likely the seller is to be liable as a prior
owner after the sale, however, the less likely a sale is to increase the number of
PRPs, and the weaker the case for protecting the buyer from liability.  The
buyer has a better case for relief from liability when the seller is likely to be
liable as a prior owner, especially if the number of PRPs at the site is small.
Courts may also take the effects that we analyze into account when they
consider whether to adopt interpretations of CERCLA that protect sellers
rather than buyers from Superfund liability.  For example, the effects that we
identify militate against a broad interpretation of the term “disposal” in
CERCLA’s liability provision, which makes prior owners liable as PRPs if
they owned the site “at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance.”
Courts have divided on the appropriate interpretation of “disposal” in this
provision, with courts adopting broader interpretations holding a larger class
of prior owners liable.  The larger the class of prior owners that are liable, the
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  54 See Chang & Sigman, supra note 28; Kornhauser & Revesz, supra note 29.
  55 See Kahan, supra note 45; Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Evaluating the
Effects of Alternative Superfund Liability Rules, in Analyzing Superfund, supra note 37, at
115, 116-28; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of
Settlements and Trials, 8 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 109 (1988); Kathryn E. Spier, A Note on Joint
and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23 J. Legal Stud. 559 (1994);
Tom H. Tietenberg, Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and Several Liability, 65
Land Econ. 305 (1989).
  56 See Kathleen Segerson, Property Transfers and Environmental Pollution: Incentive Effects
of Alternative Policies, 70 Land Econ. 261 (1994).
  57 See David B. Spence, Imposing Individual Liability as a Legislative Policy Choice:
Holmesian “Intuitions” and Superfund Reform, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 389 (1999).
larger the set of owners that will be discouraged by Superfund liability from
selling the property.  These owners cannot avoid Superfund liability by selling
the property (even at a discount) and therefore have diminished incentives to
sell, even when such a sale would be efficient.  The case for protecting the
prior owner from liability grows weaker, however, as buyers become more
likely to enjoy protection from liability.
The effects we identify, however, are only a few of the many
considerations to weigh in a more comprehensive analysis of the costs and
benefits of these policy alternatives.  There are many other reasons militating
in favor or against these policies.  For example, a broader scope for joint and
several liability may affect incentives for the parties to settle out of court,
thereby avoiding costly litigation.54  These rules may also affect incentives for
precaution against environmental contamination.55  Expanding the class of
parties from which the government can recover full damages may promote the
internalization of negative externalities, especially in the presence of
judgment-proof PRPs, which in turn would improve the incentives to reduce
contamination.56  Finally, joint and several liability under Superfund may also
raise issues of fairness.57  While such a comprehensive normative analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper, we hope to inform these debates by
contributing to a more complete picture of the effects of Superfund liability on
the incentives to develop contaminated property.
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  58 See Chang & Sigman, supra note 28, at 216, 234.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we prove the proposition that the government will not
settle with any defendants if outcomes at trial are independent (m=N),
defendants losing at trial would pay equal shares, litigation costs are zero, and
the government cannot make settlement offers that bind only if all defendants
accept.  This proof extends this result from the two-defendant case to the
general N-defendant case in which N$1.  We have shown elsewhere that the
government would not settle with all defendants in this case.58  Now suppose
that the government decides to settle with k defendants for a total amount S
and litigate against the other N-k defendants, where 1#k<N.  The government
would then receive the following payoff:
S + (1 - S)[1 - (1 - p)N-k]. (A1)
We can express this payoff as follows:
1 - (1 - p)N-k +  S(1 - p)N-k. (A2)
We can see from this expression that if the government settles with these
defendants, it will prefer the largest settlement amount S that it can obtain
from the defendants.  For the government to prefer this settlement over
litigation against all N defendants, the following inequality must hold:
1 - (1 - p)N-k +  S(1 - p)N-k > 1 - (1 - p)N. (A3)
If we solve inequality (A3) for S, we can show that this inequality holds if and
only if
S > 1 - (1 - p)k. (A4)
Next consider the maximum amount that these k defendants would agree to
pay in a settlement.  As we have seen, the government can obtain the
maximum amount through a Chicago auction.  In the case of this settlement,
each defendant would bid an amount s high enough to make each indifferent
between settling for s and being one of the N-k defendants litigating against
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the government after k defendants have each settled for this amount s.  Given
that each settling defendant pays an equal amount in such a settlement, we
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We can show that this amount is less than the settlement amount in
inequality (A4) that the government would require to make this settlement
worthwhile:
. (A7)















By multiplying both sides of inequality (A7) by N - k(1-p)N-k, then simplifying,
we can show that this inequality is true if and only if:
, (A8)
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which we know must be true for any k<N, because a defendant only gains by
having more defendants added to the case.
A defendant gains from the addition of more defendants, which would
reduce that defendant’s expected share of liability in the event that a court
finds the defendant liable.  To prove inequality (A8) formally, we can take the
derivative of the left-hand side of this inequality with respect to N and show
that this derivative is negative if and only if
[1 - Nln(1 - p)](1 - p)N < 1. (A9)
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Note that the left-hand side of inequality (A9) equals one if p=0, so if this side
decreases in p, then this inequality is true.  To prove inequality (A9) holds, we
can take the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to p and show that
this derivative is negative if and only if
N2ln(1 - p) < 0, (A10)
which is true for any N>0 and 0<p<1.
Thus, we have established the proposition that the government would never
find it in its interest to enter a single settlement and litigate against the
nonsettling defendants.  We can use this proposition to show that the
government would never enter a series of settlements either.  First, recall that
we have shown that the government would always litigate against two
defendants.  We can extend this result to the case of three defendants using our
proposition, which implies that the government could not gain by settling with
the third defendant nor by settling with two of the three defendants.  With this
result, we can then use our proposition to extend the result to the case of four
defendants, as so forth, so that the result must hold for any N.  Q.E.D.
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